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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

BEN FIDEL SALAZAR,
Plaintiff/Appellant
Case No. 910533

vs.
WARDEN, UTAH STATE PRISON

Priority No. 3

Defendant/Appellee

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Title 78,
Chapter 2, Section 2(3)(i)(j); Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3(g),
Utah Code Annotated

(1953 as amended), wherein the appellant

appeals from the denial of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
challenging the conviction for a capital felony.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the Court strictly comply with the requirements, in
accepting a plea to a capital felony, pursuant to Rule 11, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure?

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The texts of those statutes and constitutional provisions that
do not appear in the body of the brief are included in Appendix A.
1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
If the Court did not strictly comply with the requirements of
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting appellant's
plea to a capital felony, then the decision of the District Court
to deny appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be
reversed and the plea of appellant withdrawn.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged in the Third Judicial District Court in
an Information with the capital felony of homicide, murder in the
First

Degree,

in violation of Title 76, Chapter

5, Section

202(l)(h), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
Appellant entered a plea of guilty as charged.

A subsequent

penalty hearing was conducted, and appellant was sentenced to life
in prison.
Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea.

Substitute

counsel was appointed, as it was determined that a conflict of
interest existed with the further representation by trial counsel.
A subsequent Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed.
hearing,

the

Court

determined

that

the

motion

to

At a

withdraw

appellant's plea had not been timely filed and dismissed the same.
Following further evidentiary hearing, the Court denied appellant's
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Ben Fidel Salazar was charged in an Information in
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the Third Judicial District Cour*
c

L

number 884991356, with
- • j i." p.e (l J in i \ ' i. o J. <a 1 1 ID 11 o 1*

.

Title :>

Chapter 5 f Section 202(1 m

as amended)

Utah Code Annotated (1953

-'at lu* was accused of knowingly or intentionally

sti ring 1 ing

t I e Mi m 11 * iy»j ha / i ny her r previously convi cted of

a second degree felony involving the use or threat of violence to
Two attorneys witl i the Sail; Lakrc Leqal

a person.

Defenders

Association were appointed to represent appellant.
On September
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,
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After
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The CO'Ui I d e t e r m i n e d

that

appellant's motion concerning the withdrawal of his plea had not
been timely filed and the motion was denied, IT, H" "
n J 1.1 ow J ii'inji i in i PV.L den I i a i y hearing and argument, the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied and Findings of Fact and an
Order Denying Writ of Habeas Corpus was entered on Noveinbei

3

" I'I'll

(Record pp.41-44).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant is entitled to reversal of the Court's denial of his
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and, consequently, appellant
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.

In accepting

appellant's plea of guilty to a capital felony, it was necessary
that the Court strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

This rule incorporates the

examination a court must make of the appellant to be satisfied that
his plea of guilty is knowingly and voluntarily made as a matter of
due

process

of

law,

pursuant

to Amendment

XIV,

Section

1,

Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 7,
Constitution of the State of Utah.
The Court's inquiry was deficient in several areas. There was
a failure to make findings and advise appellant regarding the
nature and elements of the offense and that by entering his plea,
he was admitting those elements [Rule ll(5)(d)]. The Court further
failed to advise appellant regarding the minimum and maximum
sentence that could be imposed or the process by which that
sentence would be determined. [Rule ll(5)(e)].

Finally, pursuant

to Rule 11(5)(f) there was no showing that appellant understood the
plea agreement.
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POlN'l I
DID THE COURT FAIL TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 11, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
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plea is an admission nf .-* 1 1 i host-'" eleiiieivl "
The following is the exchange between the Court and appellant
regarding the elements of the offense:
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Q:

Now the State of Utah is required to prove your
guilt in this matter beyond a reasonable doubt.
Have you and your counsel discussed that fact?

A:

Yes, your Honor.

Q:

Has your counsel explained to you the elements of
the crimes involved here and the proof necessary,
that the State must produce to prove a charge
against you under those elements?

A:

Yes, your Honor.

Q:

Alright, Mr. Bradshaw, have you gone over with Mr.
Salazar, thoroughly, the elements involved in both
these, in particular, in the Count I criminal
homicide, murder in the first degree charge?

Mr. Bradshaw:

Yes, your Honor; both Mrs. Palacios and I have
reviewed with Mr. Salazar what the elements the
State would be required to prove—the degree of
proof they would have to meet. It's my belief that
Mr. Salazar understands those.

The Court:

That also your belief, Mrs. Palacios?

Mrs. Palacios: Yes, your Honor, it is.
The Court:

Mr. Salazar, you agree with that?

Mr. Salazar:

Yes, I do, your Honor.
Exhibit 2 Page 3-4;
Record, pp.22-23

The focus of the examination was whether counsel had advised
appellant of the elements of the offense to which he was pleading
guilty.

The Court does not seek to determine whether Salazar

understands those elements or admits that the essential conduct
which would constitute those elements was committed by him.

No

attempt is made to determine whether Salazar understands that his
plea of guilty is an admission of the elements constituting the
offense.
Subsection (5)(e) of Rule 11 requires the Court to find that
6

the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence that may be
imposed upon him for the offense to which he is pleading.
The Statement of Defendant used in connection with the plea
outlines the possible penalty as "life or death". There is nothing
in this declaration which outlines the procedure in a capital
felony of having a penalty hearing in making the sentencing
determination, except where the State promises to present no
evidence in aggravation at the "penalty phase." (Record p.13)
The following is the exchange between the Court and Salazar
during the hearing:
The Court:

Well, have your attorneys gone over with you
the possible penalties that can be imposed by
the Court for the crime of criminal homicide,
murder in the first degree, Mr. Salazar?

Salazar:

Yes, your Honor.

Q:

And you're aware of what those are?

A:

Yes, your Honor.

Q:

Are you aware that any recommendation by the
State
or
by
your
attorneys;
those
recommendations are not binding on the Court
at the time of sentencing, and the Court can
sentence in any way that is consistent with
law; do you understand that?

A:

Yes, your Honor.
Exhibit 2, at p. 7,
Record p. 26

Again the focus of the Court in this area of inquiry is
whether Salazar's attorneys have discussed with him the possible
penalty.

No attempt

is made to determine whether appellant

understands the penalty ramification of his plea. The appellant is
7

misled by the Court's comment concerning recommendations.

In a

capital felony, sentencing determinations are handled differently.
Connected with Salazar's knowledge regarding the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed, but also impacting on (5)(f)
of Rule 11, is the exchange between the Court regarding the plea
agreement.

The phrase in the Statement of Defendant that "the

State would submit no evidence in aggravation at the penalty
phase", is the complete extent to which this affidavit attempts to
articulate the parameters of the plea agreement.
In discussing this matter, the Court inquires, after accepting
that affidavit, whether the State's prosecutor has further areas of
concern.

In an exchange, on the record, between the prosecutor,

one of Salazar's attorneys, and the Court, there is an attempt to
outline what effect the State's agreement to submit no evidence in
aggravation at the penalty phase will mean.

Salazar's attorney

articulates that agreement in this way:

Ms. Palacios:

. . . what Ben understands
is not seeking the death
they do intend to submit
they did and argue that.
that, Ben?

Mr. Salazar:

Yeah.

is, that the State
penalty, although
the transcript as
Do you understand

Exhibit 2 at page 11,
Record p. 30
However, when the State indicates that they would argue in the
penalty phase that the defendant should spend his life in prison,
Mr. Salazar objects, and there is a further conference, with the
attorneys, off the record.

The Court never makes an inquiry or
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examines

appellant

regarding

his

understanding

of

the

plea

negotiations.
In Bovkin v, Alabama, 395 US 238 (1969), the Supreme Court
determined

that, as a matter of due process of law, it was

incumbent on the trial court, prior to accepting a plea of guilty,
to satisfy itself that the defendant understands what he is doing
and the consequences in entering a guilty plea. The Court spoke in
terms of making an intelligent choice on the part of the defendant
and the court satisfying itself with a record that demonstrates the
defendant has made his choice with full knowledge.
In McCarthy v. U.S. 394 US 459 (1969), the Court spoke in
terms of a thorough interrogation of the defendant prior to
entering his plea, which exposes the defendant's state of mind. In
McCarthy, supra,

there is a specific discussion regarding the need

for the defendant to understand and to admit to the elements of the
offense.
In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 US 637 (1976), the Court again
required that the defendant must understand the elements of the
crime charged and the relationship of the law to the facts.
In Utah, this due process requirement is incorporated in Rule
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In connection with a guilty

plea, the courts have developed an affidavit or statement of
defendant used in connection with accepting a guilty plea.
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P 2d 1309 (Utah 1987), this court
determined

that

there

should

be

strict

compliance

with

the

requirements of Rule 11. Regarding the use of written affidavits,
9

the Court concluded:
"The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote
efficiency but an affidavit should only be the
starting point, not an end point in the
pleading process,"
Gibbons, supra,

at page 13.

The object of the exercise is for the Court to determine
whether, in fact, the plea is made in a truly knowing and voluntary
manner.

Specifically, whether the areas outlined in Rule 11 have

been covered and the Court is able to make its findings regarding
a defendant's knowledge and understanding of the consequences of
the plea.
The Utah Court of Appeals has dealt with aspects of this issue
on several occasions.

Recently, in State v. Smith, 812 P 2d 470

(Ut. App. 1991), the Court viewed the use of written statements in
connection with the plea as an integral part of an efficiency
promoting function.
strict

compliance

defendant.

This does not detract from the standard of
in making

the necessary

examination

of a

The affidavit's function is to eliminate the need to

repeat, to the defendant, verbatim, the inquiries of the affidavit.
However, it is still necessary to interrogate the defendant in
making a determination as to his knowing and voluntary plea.
See State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P 2d, 92 (Ut. App. 1988); State v.
Valencia. 776 P 2d 1332 (Ut. App. 1989); State v. Pharris, 798 P 2d
772 (Ut. App. 1990).
In this case, the Court's use of the Statement of Defendant
and

its

colloquy

with

Salazar
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failed

to

satisfy

specific

requirements of Rule 11. The Court incorrectly focused on whether
Salazar's attorneys had discussed these important areas of concern
with him, rather than his understanding.

An examination by the

Court of the defendant, concerning his understanding of the nature
and elements of the offense, that a plea is an admission of those
elements and the sentencing ramifications, is necessary.

It is

incumbent on the Court to create a record which demonstrates a
strict compliance with Rule 11 in making the examination. This was
inadequately done in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court's denial of the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be reversed and defendant allowed
to withdraw his plea of guilty.

Dated this ^JJ)

day of ^j/^JFtA/^fl/lU

1992.

Respectfully /submitted,

Attorney fgf Defendant/Appellant
431 South 300 East #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel. (801)322-1616
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant were delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
February 1992.
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APPENDIX A

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Article I, Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

TEXT OF STATUTES
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 11. Pleas
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no
contest, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(a) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he
has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory
self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to confront and
cross-examine in open court the witnesses against him,
and that by entering the plea he waived all of those
rights;
(d) the defendant understands the nature and elements of

the offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and the
plea is a admission of all those elements;
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence
that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a
plea is entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences;
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement
has been reached; and
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or not
contest.

